Oliver: The Historical Perspective: A Vital Force in United States_Latin

THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: A VITAL
FORCE IN UNITED STATES-LATIN
AMERICAN RELATIONS; NEGLECTED
HERE, DISTORTED THERE
COVEY T. OLIVER*
An appreciation of the historical perspective is vital to efficacy
in inter-American affairs. The United States and Latin America
treat historical perspective in different ways: the United States
largely ignores it, whereas Latin America often perceives it in a
distorted form.
A clue as to why the United States so blandly disregards the
history of inter-American relations is found in the national character of the United States. It seems a part of that character to live in
the present and the future-to forget the negative or distressing
events in its past, and to remember only the good and glorious in
broad outline form.
The propensity of the United States to leave history behind
may have been of great value to its national psyche. However, in
terms of international relations, this characteristic has been costly
for the United States. Lack of comprehension by the United States
has often generated embittered feelings in foreign countries with
which it has been involved. The following illustrates how the
United States tends to forget-to disregard history while other nations live intimately with it. (This illustration is based on personal
experiences while negotiating with the Russians.)
Soon after World War II, negotiations with the Soviet Union
evoked constant references by their spokesmen to the American invasion of Siberia. Along with certain allies, the United States entered Siberia in 1918-1919 for the purpose of supporting the White
Armies against the Red Armies during the Revolution. The outcome was that the expedition suffered hard defeat at the hands of
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the Bolsheviks. The important point, however, is that few Americans who are not specialists in Soviet Affairs even know of the
American-Siberian expedition. Thus, spokespersons for the Soviet
Union impugn (whether seriously or not is another question) the
motives of the United States regarding not only early enmity toward the socialist replacement of Tsarism, but also regarding intervention by force.
There are many parallels to this incident in inter-American relations. For reasons that are in part mysterious, many poets, journalists, politicians, teachers, and some scholars of Latin America
tend to look back; to compress time into the wholeness of history
and place themselves into that history.' Perhaps the true answer as
to why Latin Americans live so intimately with history, as compared to the United States, comes from social psychology. People
who have not been as successful in some particulars as their neighbors look to find reasons that absolve them 2 from faults or
deficiences in the past conduct of such neighbors.
Thus, instances in the historic past of external injustices or affronts tend not to be forgotten in Latin America. Sometimes these
incidents are magnified, especially when new occasions for complaints arise. The United States is often the target of adverse historical recollections in Latin America, because this country has
loomed so long and large in the lives of Latin Americans. At the
same time, there is a lack of knowledge on the part of the people in
the United States regarding the concerns of Latin America and its
people. This discontinuity can but cause continuous difficulty in
our relations.
The Latin Americans know more about the United States,
(those of them that are within the reach of newsprint or reception
from "radio newspapers") than we in the United States know about
them. Because they scrutinize us intensely, they tend to take our
good sides for granted and then proceed to magnify our flaws, including those that have become historic to them.
I. When I first read Salvador de Madariaga's magnificent book, SPAIN (written in English whilst he was a refugee at Oxford during the Civil War) during service in Spain, World
War II, I became aware of the compression of time described in the text, although I realized
that I had been aware of it subliminally since childhood on the Mexican border.
2. To put it more bluntly, people whose lives are not full of new, memorable events
tend to keep alive older memorable events that more active people tend to forget. But this is
not quite all, for there is--sharpening the contrast--the propensity of North Americans to
forget defeats, failures and tragedies; c. the War of 1812, Siberia (1919) and Vietnam. The
major exception is perhaps the greatest of our national tragedies, the Civil War (18611865)-in literature at least it is still with us.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol12/iss3/5

2

Oliver: The Historical Perspective: A Vital Force in United States_Latin
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Our lack of knowledge of the past fosters insensitivity and
often results in self-satisfied, well-meaning advice to others-such
as to follow in the democratic footsteps of the United States. Much
of our advice becomes difficult (if not impossible) for Latin
America to follow because of the vast differences in background
and conditioning of the respective countries.3
On the other hand, to balance the scale, the Latin American
propensity to live closely linked to grievances originating in the
past is socially unhealthy in both a global and hemispheric sense.4
The solution, obviously, is a better balance between the extremes of
ignoring the past versus reliving the past. The need for development of more commonly held perceptions of objective will, motive
and values between the United States and Latin America is great.
Its fulfillment is a charge on each and every concerned individual,
both here and there.
I.

THE EFFECTS OF HISTORY ON INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS

A.

A4 Case Study of United States-Mexican Relations

The history of United States' foreign investment in oil in Mexico has had a very important effect on United States' relations with
Mexico. The scenario of this relationship properly begins at least
as early as 529 A.D., when the Justinian Code codified as a principle of Roman law the rule that the subsoil and its wealth belong to
the public and that the State is legally incapable of alienating it into
private ownership. From Roman law, this principle became Spanish law.' In 1523, the King of Spain declared that the rule as to
public ownership of the sub-surface be applied in the vice-royalties
of New Spain. Since 1820, the various constitutions of Mexico in3. This includes such highly relevant factors as literacy, communications, institutions
and social conscience. From the beginning, the United States has been startlingly successful
among nations in the acceptance of civilian supremacy by the military; but presumably, so
was Rome for the first seven hundred years.
4. One of the uglier sides of Latin America's face to the United States is the willingness
of opinion molders there to blame indigenous deficiencies on the United States, even where a
causal link is ephemeral or nonexistent, saying at the same time to American officials in
private, "Our politics require us to blast you in public, although be assured that privately we
want you to know that you are not at fault."
5. Like most other North Americans, I knew of neither the Roman law principle nor
the Consejo de Aranjuez (1523), whereby the King of Spain applied it to his domain in the
Americas, until I spent part of a summer at El Instituto de Derecho Comparado at the National Autonomous University of Mexico in 1961. The history of how the Roman law returned to Spain, once a Roman colony, through the Visigoths is very interesting.
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corporated the Roman-Spanish principle into Mexican supreme
law.
Circa 1900, British and American oil companies acquired oil
exploration rights in Mexico from an old-style,paterfamilias-president-turned-dictator, Porfirio Diaz. Oil and gas "leases" in the
Pennsylvania-Texas, sub-surface ownership form were made.
These gave the foreign oil companies real property interests in the
oil and gas in place in the sub-surface. Nothing could have been
more contrary to Mexican law and custom.
In 1910, the Mexican Revolution began. It resulted in (among
other things) the loss of a million lives, and it gave us modem Mexico. From 1914 to 1916, President Wilson, true to his version of
human rights-that governments should only come to office by ballots, not by bullets-bombarded Vera Cruz, and later ordered Pershing to pursue Villa in Mexico. In 1917, now on the road to
coherent national government, Mexico promulgated the Constitution of 1917.
The Constitution, non-Marxist in orientation, was and is regarded by Mexico and comparative political science as an excellent
modem constitution. Article 27 of the Constitution reiterates the
Roman-Spanish-Mexican principle of law regarding subsoil mineral rights. Concessionaires have only contract rights (not property
rights) with the owner--the State. (In retrospect, the arrangement
that would have been provided under the Roman-Spanish-Mexican
law was a kind of management service contract: the sort of arrangement that American oil companies of late have come to accept
abroad by another route after many years.) From 1917 to 1921, the
oil companies asserted their acquired property rights and protested
the application of Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution to concessions
in Mexico.
Complaints on the oil companies' behalf were lodged with the
United States Government. In 1921, the United States had not yet
recognized the Obreg6n regime that incontestably had consolidated
governmental power in itself throughout Mexico. The time for recognition was at hand, but the United States attached a precondition
thereto: Mexico must agree to recognize the continued sub-surface
ownership rights of the American oil companies. Mexican representatives reluctantly agreed to this precondition and the United
States recognized Mexico, belatedly. Article 27 was seemingly set
aside, and Mexicans have never forgotten or forgiven the "Bucarelli
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Agreement," named for the house on that Mexico City street where
it was (in their view) forced on Mexico.
From 1921 to 1938, criticism over the presence of the American oil companies as owners mounted. Mexico, through a distinguished foreign minister, announced the Estrada Doctrine, which
stated that revolutionary change was not an occasion for recognition any more than change by an election.
In 1938, a leftist (though not Marxist) President of Mexico,
Lazaro Cardenas, applied the Mexican labor code rigorously to the
American and British oil companies. This was defacto discrimination. Outraged upon losing in the Supreme Court of Mexico, companies announced in one of the most ill-advised public statements
ever made by foreign investors that they would not obey the decision of the Supreme Court of Mexico. The Labor Code of Mexico
provides that under such circumstances the State shall intervene. It
was in this way that the oil interests became nationalized. The
companies, in effect, handed over their investments by being stupidly insensitive.
This episode is vividly remembered, not only in Mexico, but
throughout Latin America and is taught to the young (including
lawyers-to-be and foreign service officers-to-be). Yet it is probably
known only to a very few in the United States-mainly to those
that have worked in that most exhausting of foreign affairs vineyards, inter-American relations. Some aspects of this episode deserve specific attention.
B. Policy Considerationsas to the Episode
Out of this episode grew a Latin American doctrine that is very
difficult for us to live with in the Western Hemisphere. The doctrine supports the principle that application of superior political or
economic power is illicit intervention or aggression. The Latins
claim that illegal imposition of national will of one state upon another state is not limited to the use of military force.
This is an important and far-reaching doctrine, and a source of
both controversy and alienation. Woodrow Wilson's use of nonrecognition of non-elected but "in charge" governments thus became "intervention-aggression." Sixty years later, Carter's "denials" policy in support of human rights was also so denounced-at
least by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and several other countries domi-
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nated by military Juntas.6
II.

INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS:

ATTEMPTING TO BALANCE

OPPOSING VALUES

In enumerating the pluses and minuses in inter-American relations from a historical perspective, it should be noted that for every
major plus, there are a few small minuses and sometimes faint
pluses link to a big minus. The major pluses taken into consideration here include: (1) independence; (2) togetherness in a new
world; and, (3) complementary economies. The major minuses relevant here are: (1) shifts in the intensity and quality of United
States interests in Latin America (referred to as the "Syndrome of
the Gringo's Light Switch" 7-it's on and off with the United
States-not continuous as far as our relationships with Latin
America or Latin American countries); (2) Latin America's failures
regarding social justice and good public administration; and, (3) the
impass6 as to direct foreign investment-to which issue have recently been added the utterances of the new President of the United
States.
A.

Independence

In addressing the above considerations, an important point to
remember is that the essence of the historic linkage between the
United States and the Latin American countries is that both severed the bonds between themselves and their mother countries. As
the first of these, the United States was taken as a model for others.
Thus, monarchial government was replaced by republican institutions in all of the new Latin countries (except, at first, Brazil). The
personages, styles and institutions stemming from the American
Revolution of 1776 were, and still are, highly admired in Latin
America-even if not always followed in actual practice.
6. It was probably Wilson's first Secretary of State, old commoner, William Jennings
Bryan, who was responsible for the beginning of Mr. Wilson's primitive, "political human
rights" drive. Unlike the later individual human rights efforts of Carter, who was never clear
what lengths the United States would go to enforce a preference for participatory democracy
as a human right, Wilson started there with bombardment and nonrecognition, but did not
link affirmative action to torture, incommunicado jailing and other outrages to individual
human dignity. It is likely that Bryan-Wilson were motivated in part by their detestation of
Victoriano Huerta, who took over the Revolution by having the first revolutionary President,
Francisco Madero, murdered.
7. So far as I know, it was not approved by any other country in Latin America either,
because it was viewed as a unilateral application of American economic power.
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However, a related minus is the fact that Latin American
countries are no longer Iberian countries alone. There is a new
group of independent countries that had no revolutions. These
countries separated peaceably from their mother country, Great
Britain. Whether they adhered to the Crown or not, these countries
have forms of government that are based upon the British parliamentary system rather than upon the Constitution of the United
States (with its intricate separation-of-power system) which had
been widely copied at an earlier time by the Iberic revolutionary
countries.
The fact that the Iberian revolutionaries decided to pay the
United States the compliment of copying its Constitution of 1789
has created serious problems for them. It has placed great strains
on the legislative branches and the courts in many Latin American
countries. These strains have resulted in the failure of these institutions to function as counterpoises to strong executives, including
military coupists.
Because of what Latin America has done-emulating the
United States-in a sense, the United States is seen as responsible,
even if not directly at fault--or at least implicated-in the failures
of democratic government in Latin America.' While it is questionable whether the nature of government in Latin America would
have been very different even if not copied from the United States
Constitution, considering Latin America's administrative and governmental antecedents in a direct line from Rome, the failures there
tarnish the common revolutionary heritage, away from colonial status and European patterns of government, toward the American
(political) and the French (social) revolutions.
B.

Togetherness in a New World

Today, we do not hear much from Latin America of the
"home" hemispere or the New World of the Western Hemisphere;
instead we hear of the First World, the Second World and the
Third World. (Those of us here who look at the Third World know
there really are Third, Fourth and Fifth Worlds.) We, too, look at
the world globally (as it were) and in the process, have begun to
lose, to some extent, the mystique of the Nuevo Mundo that we
shared with our fellow revolutionaries of the Western Hemisphere.
8. See Oliver, The Gringos' Light Switch andHuman, Political,and Security Relationships in the New World South and East of the United States, 17 WILLIAMETTE LAW REVIEW
185 (1980).
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That mystique was enshrined in the original Monroe Doctrine.
The Monroe Doctrine is the product of possibly America's greatest
Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams. The Monroe Doctrine was
accepted in Latin America until Theodore Roosevelt, in 1904, added the Roosevelt Corollary. Unfortunately, this Corollary, which
too many Congressional leaders in foreign affairs and policy decision-makers in the executive are not aware of, spoils the Doctrine
for Latin America, as it is hegemonic and interventionistic. Its basic notion is that in as much as the United States has said that the
Europeans cannot influence political and military events in the
Western Hemisphere, we must see to it that the countries behind
our shield act properly. In other words, the Roosevelt Corollary
was a plain spoken contention of the legitimacy of intervention to
preserve international decency in the Western Hemisphere as the
United States sees "decency."
The Monroe Doctrine, after Roosevelt I, came to be a very
serious minus in pulling together the New World. Franklin
Roosevelt and the Good Neighbor Policy, in 1933, at the Montevideo Conference on Inter-American Affairs, changed the original
Monroe Doctrine into a multilateral, Western Hemisphere doctrine. However, it has continued to be seen as interventionistic because many decision-makers in America do not seem to understand
that it is now a multilateralversion of the original, not a unilateral
version of the original cum corollary. Although the Roosevelt I Corollary was dropped by Roosevelt II, it was not forgotten because it
still lives in American power-wielders' minds. Thus, there exists
today a great deal of confusion about the Monroe Doctrine. Also,
the Doctrine today suffers as to credibility from the reality of extracontinental Soviet presence and power in the Western
Hemisphere.9
C. Inter-American Economic Systems
While actual unification of political and social systems has not
been attained in the Western Hemisphere, there exists a very active,
real inter-American economic system: one that includes trade, capital movements and a high degree of linkage as to raw materials,
technology and market management. A complicating factor (one
9. Yet another example of the "Blame the Gringo Syndrome"; see supra note 4 and
accompanying text; but also perhaps as an indicator of how fortunate the United States has
been so far with a system of government based upon struggles for leadership in decision
making between the President and Congress, such as the one we are now living through.
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of the minuses to this plus) is the negative Latin attitude with regard to the entry of new, direct or permanently foreign, private sector business investment, particularly from the United States on
normal, viable business bases."° Despite the difficulties, there is an
immense reality to inter-American trade and the fitting together of
productive capacities in the Western Hemisphere.
D.

The Gringos' Light Switch

The fact that we have waxed and waned in our attention toward Latin America is a minus. There is no question that the
United States wooed Latin America earnestly from 1941 to 1946,
and was also very grateful to Latin America (speaking as a participant in the process) for Latin America's assistance to the Allied
Cause during World War II. Raw materials, bases and many other
things were opened to the United States at that time. Latin
America expected better of us after the war and they did not get it.
Our attention was drawn elsewhere. Latin America saw us as turning away in an ungrateful manner.

III.

PSYCHO-PERSONAL ASPECTS OF LATIN SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL FAILURES

An aspect of inter-American relations that cannot be ignored is
the psycho-personal one of failure to achieve. This is difficult to
10. When this piece was written, in November of 1981, the Monroe Doctrine was impaired by the presence of Soviet force in Cuba. Despite the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and
several build-ups of concern within the United States in the period since, the "extra-continental", hegemonistic Soviet presence has continued. Due to the vagaries of legal periodical
publication, the final revision of this Article has taken place after the Falkland (Malvinas)
Islands crisis of April through July, 1982. Although the Monroe Doctrine was not intended
to require extra-continentals to abandon existing territories in the Western Hemisphere as of
1826, all of Latin America except Chile, Colombia, and Trinidad-Tobago, relied upon a
spurious notion of anticipatory self-defense by Argentina and characterized Britain as an
extra-continental intruder, justifying a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Rio Pact
of Reciprocal Assistance. In the process, the United States bore the brunt of attack as a
traducer of "continental solidarity." Only the above three states and the United States acted
responsibly and in conformity to Article 2-4 of the Charter of the United Nations in repelling
illicit use of force for the resolution of a pre-Charter territorial dispute. Latin America's
support of naked aggression in the name of "anti-extra-continentalism"-yet with the Soviets in Cuba-is a most disquieting development, one that at the same time highlights the
distortion of the propensity to live with history, the waywardness of military rule, and the
"Blame the Gringo Syndrome." The current fall-out may be just the beginning as to the
future of United States relations with Latin America. The United States risked NATO and
more in 1956 to resist British-French-Israeli naked aggression at Suez. We had no valid
reason to fear risk of the inter-American system in 1982, but nonetheless, the Latins would
have it so.
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describe in terms of national character, but a type of Black Legend
hangs over Latin Americans. There is (based on a life-time association with Latin America) a sensitivity there to attitudes in the
United States, especially on the part of our Chief Executives. The
Latin Americans, though they do not vote for the President of the
United States, feel as strongly about particular Presidents" as
many of us in the United States do, in. one way or another. At this
writing, the question arises: How is Latin America going to "come
down" with regard to the present President of the United States?
Suffice it to say, based on personal impression in the last election-Latin America was neutral; the same way that many North
Americans were neutral, because they regretted the choice that had
to be made. Neither leading candidate attracted them. Carter's
personality turned them off. Reagan's economic philosophy baffled
them.
Latin America's failures with regard to humaneness, social jus11. To generalize somewhat egregiously through personal impressions from talks with
Latin Americans over many years, I offer this scorecard:
(1) Theodore Roosevelt--ogre, interventionist, imperialist.
(2) Woodrow Wilson--dangerous in his protestant self-righteousness, interventionist.
(3) Taft, Harding, Coolidge-nothings.
(4) Herbert Hoover-friend of the rich, inept, humorless.
(5) Franklin Roosevelt--comparable only to Washington and Lincoln; architect of the Good Neighbor Policy; witty and well-born, but a friend of the poor.
(6) Truman-dominated by a Secretary of State (Acheson) who had little interest in Latin America; between them they turned their backs on a hemisphere
that, except for Argentina, had supported America against the Axis; did make a
modest beginning as to technical assistance to development.
(7) Eisenhower-more of the same, except for the efforts of his brother,
Milton; did nothing until the last year of his presidency and then only because
Nixon got the stones, eggs and spit in Caracas and Lima.
(8) Kennedy-a young, catholic hero with a handsome, spanish-speaking
wife; architect of the Alliance for Progress; tragic figure-now a lay saint.
(9) Johnson-despite his accentuation of Kennedy's development policies and
his Franklin Rooseveltian concern for the masses, not a super-hero; but not an
uncaring man either; his step-up of the war in Vietnam deprived Latin America of
expected additional development assistance.
(10) Nixon--detested; the Latins considered that he was determined to seek
revenge for his treatment there while vice-president; he and Kissinger saw all of
Latin America as a big Mexico.
(11) Ford-mejor que nada (meaning "better than nothing"); Kissinger finally
got below Mexico (once).
(12) Carter-an undignified Wilson; a small, protestant, humorless and naive
man; how could Americans have elected him?
(13) Reagan--knows very little but only appears naive; a determined reactionary; too early to categorize as plus or minus; was he elected because Caner was
worse, or because America had turned rightest? Latin American Scorecard:
Plus .............. 4
M inus ............
6
Indifferent ........ 4
Uncertain .........
I
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tice and good administration are very well known in the United
States. It is very difficult for us (in the United States) to do what
many of us would like to do for Latin America when particular
countries there comport themselves in a manner which is antithetical to fundamental expectations of human decency and honest, effective administration. It is a common phenomenon to see others'
faults more readily than we see our own; and it happens in this
case (stated as a personal viewpoint-with respect and friendship)
that the Latin American faults, speaking without reference to any
particular country, are very great. It is sad to observe that over a
lifetime one can see that what was once regarded as the injustice of
the Black Legend is in fact somewhat supported by events in Latin
America. This is sad and ought to be of more active concern there
than is presently discernible.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There are no difficulties in inter-American relations that are
not curable. We in the United States of America, our neighbor to
the North (Canada) and all of the countries to the South and East
of us are in the process of adjusting to new global arrangements.
The new pieces have not been fitted together yet. They are still
rubbing against each other until they are properly positioned. But
if each of us-we and they-understand where we began and are
fully and compassionately aware of the considerations addressed
herein, the better off we will be. Above all, if we and they can be
more aware of what we are not aware of; if we can follow a bit
better than we have in the past the injunction of Bobbie Burns-to
see ourselves as others see us-the better off we both will be.
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